



Block Cipher Modes

Multiple Blocks

- How to encrypt multiple blocks?
- Do we need a new key for each block?
 - As bad as (or worse than) a one-time pad!
- Encrypt each block independently?
- Make encryption depend on previous block?
 - That is, can we “chain” the blocks together?

Modes of Operation

- Electronic Codebook (**ECB**) mode
 - Encrypt each block independently
 - Most obvious, but has a serious weakness
- Cipher Block Chaining (**CBC**) mode
 - Chain the blocks together
 - More secure than ECB, virtually no extra work
- Counter Mode (**CTR**) mode
 - Block ciphers acts like a stream cipher
 - Popular for random access
- Cipher Feedback (**CFB**) mode
- Output Feedback (**OFB**) mode



ECB Mode

- Notation: $C = E(P, K)$
- Given plaintext $P_0, P_1, \dots, P_m, \dots$
- Most obvious way to use a block cipher:

Encrypt

$$C_0 = E(P_0, K)$$

$$C_1 = E(P_1, K)$$

$$C_2 = E(P_2, K) \dots$$

Decrypt

$$P_0 = D(C_0, K)$$

$$P_1 = D(C_1, K)$$

$$P_2 = D(C_2, K) \dots$$

- For fixed key K , this is “electronic” version of a codebook cipher (without additive)
 - With a different codebook for each key

ECB Weakness


- Suppose $P_i = P_j$
- Then $C_i = C_j$ and Trudy knows $P_i = P_j$
- This gives Trudy some information, even if she does not know P_i or P_j
- Trudy might know P_i
- Is this a serious issue?

ECB Cut and Paste Attack


- Suppose plaintext is
Alice digs Bob. Trudy digs Tom.
- Assuming 64-bit blocks and 8-bit ASCII:
 $P_0 = \text{"Alice di"}$, $P_1 = \text{"gs Bob. "}$,
 $P_2 = \text{"Trudy di"}$, $P_3 = \text{"gs Tom. "}$
- Ciphertext: C_0, C_1, C_2, C_3
- Trudy cuts and pastes: C_0, C_3, C_2, C_1
- Decrypts as
Alice digs Tom. Trudy digs Bob.

Alice Hates ECB Mode


- Alice's uncompressed image, and ECB encrypted



- ❑ Why does this happen?
- ❑ Same plaintext yields same ciphertext!



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

CBC Mode

- Blocks are “chained” together
- A random initialization vector, or IV, is required to initialize CBC mode
- IV is random, but not secret

Encryption

$$C_0 = E(IV \oplus P_0, K),$$

$$C_1 = E(C_0 \oplus P_1, K),$$

$$C_2 = E(C_1 \oplus P_2, K), \dots$$

Decryption

$$P_0 = IV \oplus D(C_0, K),$$

$$P_1 = C_0 \oplus D(C_1, K),$$

$$P_2 = C_1 \oplus D(C_2, K), \dots$$


- Analogous to classic codebook *with additive*

CBC Mode

- Identical plaintext blocks yield different ciphertext blocks — this is good!
- If C_1 is garbled to, say, G then
$$P_1 \neq C_0 \oplus D(G, K), P_2 \neq G \oplus D(C_2, K)$$
- But $P_3 = C_2 \oplus D(C_3, K), P_4 = C_3 \oplus D(C_4, K), \dots$
- Automatically recovers from errors!
- Cut and paste is still possible, but more complex (and will cause garbles)


Alice Likes CBC Mode

- Alice's uncompressed image, Alice CBC encrypted (TEA)




Attack on CBC

- Modifying Cipher Blocks:
 - You can modify the contents of one cipher block (c_6) to make the plain text (m_7) as you wish, however the preceding block (m_6) will be garbled



Counter (CTR) mode encryption



Counter (CTR) mode decryption

Counter Mode (CTR)

- CTR is popular for random access
- Use block cipher like a stream cipher

Encryption

$$C_0 = P_0 \oplus E(IV, K),$$

$$C_1 = P_1 \oplus E(IV+1, K),$$


$$C_2 = P_2 \oplus E(IV+2, K), \dots$$

Decryption


$$P_0 = C_0 \oplus E(IV, K),$$

$$P_1 = C_1 \oplus E(IV+1, K),$$


$$P_2 = C_2 \oplus E(IV+2, K), \dots$$




Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode encryption



Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode decryption



Output Feedback (OFB) mode encryption



Output Feedback (OFB) mode decryption